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Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the
initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speci¯cation in public pro-
curement and provides a rationale for design misspeci¯cation. We propose a model in which the
sponsor decides how much to invest in design speci¯cation and awards competitively the project
to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegoti-
ation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that
new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally
di®erentiated contractors, the design's speci¯cation level is seen to a®ect the resulting degree of
competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design spec-
i¯cation and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive
market supply, is to underinvest in design speci¯cation so as to make signi¯cant cost overruns
likely. Since no such misspeci¯cation occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are
seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
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i1 Introduction
Horror stories about public works or military procurement projects frequently appear in the
press. Most of the cases that catch the attention of the public eye are characterized by long
delaysand hugecost overruns, usually associated with changesof theinitial design oftheprojects.1
Accusationsagainst theprocuringagencies arefocused on theissueof poorinitial design. Agencies
are portrayed as incompetent, or in some cases as corrupt, for not paying enough attention to the
speci¯cation of projects before procuring them, thusresulting in renegotiation with thecontractor
over the projects.
This paper proposes a rationale behind this observed pattern. We show that it may be in the
interest of the procurer to underinvest in design speci¯cation. The intuition behind this result
is that, by reducing the design speci¯cation, the sponsor reduces the comparative advantage of
the most e±cient ¯rm in the awarding process. By making ¯rms more homogeneous the sponsor
intensi¯es competition and this results in a lower transfer. Wealsoshow that themorecompetitive
the market, the better speci¯ed theinitial design will be. In particular, in a perfectly competitive
market, in which ¯rms earn no rents, no design misspeci¯cation takes place.
The main goal of the paper is to use the analysis of the speci¯cation design problem to
study the cost overruns in public works. We ¯nd that cost overruns are decreasing in the design
speci¯cation level. Then, using the relationship between competitiveness and incentives to design
speci¯cation, we show that when the procurement market is more competitive cost overruns are
lower. For this reason, cost overruns are argued to be a consequence of the lack of competition in
the procurement market.
We study a simple procurement problem in which a sponsor wants to undertake a single
1The Boston harbor tunnel in Boston, USA, and the new subway system in Athens, Greece, are two archetypical
examples of public projects plagued with such problems. Another example provided by Bajari and Tadelis (2001)
is the construction of the Getty Center Art Museum in Los Angeles. The project design had to be changed due to
unanticipated site conditions and regulatory requirements, and the construction of the project took over 8 years.
While in public works cost overruns are important, cost overruns are endemic on defense procurement. For example,
Peck and Scherer (1962) stimated that, for U.S defense programs, development cost exceds originals predictions by
220% on average. Chen and Smith (2001) cite Augustine (1986) to point out that in defense projects there is only
a 10% change of meeting cost goals and a 15% chance of meeting schedule goals.
1project. There exists a ¯xed number of horizontally di®erentiated potential contractors. Prior
to the awarding process, the sponsor decides how much to invest in specifying the design (or
the blueprint) and this decision becomes public information. As a result of this learning process
an initial design is speci¯ed. The sponsor awards the construction of the initial design using a
competitive mechanism. Once the project is awarded to a contractor and in the course of its
realization, new information about the optimal design is generated, and the awarded contractor
and the sponsor engage in a bilateral renegotiation to change the initial design to accommodate
the new information. Cost overruns, i.e., the di®erence between the ¯nal price and the price
announced once the project is initially awarded, are a consequence of this renegotiation. As
often claimed, a low investment in the initial design speci¯cation is likely to lead to negotiating
signi¯cant changes and therefore to high cost overruns.2
Potential contractors in the procurement market are horizontally specialized in a speci¯c
design. As a consequenceof this, the higher the investment in design speci¯cation, the higher the
advantage of the contractor located closest to the initial design, and the larger its rents. From
a di®erent point of view, however, the higher the investment in initial design speci¯cation, the
higher the probability that the awarded contractor will be the most e±cient one, in the sense
that the probability that the awarded contractor will be the closest to the ¯nal project design is
higher. For this reason, when the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speci¯cation, he
has to trade o® optimally the reduction of procurement rents with the increase of the probability
of choosing the most e±cient ¯rm.
To summarize, the present paper shows that it may well be that some misspeci¯cation of
the initial design of the project is bene¯cial to the sponsor since leads to a more competitive
environment. This is not to say that cost overruns are always strategic, as in fact weacknowledge
that most cost overruns are because of unforeseen contingencies that were either missed because
negligence or because were really impossible to predict, but to highlight that there are some
2Ganuza (1997), an empirical study of cost overruns in public works in Spain, tries to identify the magnitude
and causes of cost overruns in larger public works. The largest 256 public work projects undertaken by the Spanish
Administration during two years led to cost overruns 77 % of the cases, average cost overruns were 22 % of budgeted
costs and 62,7% of cost overruns cases were related to changes in the projects' design during construction.
2bene¯ts associated to misspeci¯cation and most importantly, that it is reasonable to expect that
sponsor's incentives to invest in specifying the contract increase with market competition.
This article is related to two di®erent branches of the literature. First, the paper relates to
the literature concerning to explain the cost overruns and contract renegotiation in procurement.
Our motivation is closer to Bajari and Tadelis (2001). They study a similar problem in which a
buyer wishes to procure a product from a seller. As in the present paper, the buyer incurs a cost
of specifying a initial design for the product. The design is incomplete, since when production
begins, new information can make desirable to change the initial design of the product. The
larger is the investment in specifying the product, the lower is the likelihood that both parties
will need to change the design. They show that cost plus contracts are better than ¯xed price
contracts when the project is more complex. We consider only ¯xed price contracts and a single
type of project, but we add to the analysis the e®ect of ¯rms competition over sponsor incentives
in specifying the initial design of the product.
Lewis(1986) and Arvan and Leite(1989) study a framework in which: (a) procurement occurs
over an extended period, (b) the sponsor and the contractor cannot credibly commit themselves
to a long-term contract, (c) thecontractor has better information about thecost of completing the
project, and (d) most bene¯ts accrue to the sponsor only after the project is completed. In this
framework cost overruns occur because the opportunity cost of giving up the project increases.
The price of each task depends on the credible threat of stopping the project. This threat is less
crediblefor the later tasks that for the earlierones. Thus theprice that the sponsor pays increases
over time, even when the expected cost of the all stages is the same. In the present model there
is only one construction stage and, hence, we do not have this dynamic e®ect. Gaspar and Leite
(1989) present a model in which theprocurement mechanisminducesan ex post downward bias on
project cost and consequently cost overruns. In their model, the sponsor has to choose between n
potential contractors after receiving a signal about the real cost of theproject for each contractor.
Thissignal is thesum of theidiosyncraticcost of the¯rmand a measurement error. The¯rm with
thelowest signal is the¯rm with the lowest expected cost. In addition, the expected measurement
3error for this ¯rm is negative, leading to underestimation of the true cost, and cost overruns. We
are not considering this sort of cost uncertainty, and, hence, do not study this e®ect in our model.
Our paper is also related to the literature that analyzes endogenous information structures in
auctions, in particular with the papers focus on the incentives of sponsor to disclose information
to bidders. The central result in this literature is the \linkage principle" derived by Milgron and
Weber (1982) in an a±liated environment. This resultsstates that to commit to fully and publicly
announce all information the auctioneer has is theexpected-revenue-maximizing policy. Recently,
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) and Ganuza (2003) show that this result can not be extended
to private value environments. There is a fundamental di®erence between private and common
value setting, when the principal disclose information to bidders previously to the auction. In
common value environments, bidders react symmetrically to the information revealed by the
auctioneer. In contrast, in a private value environment, when the principal disclose information
of the object will raise the valuation of some bidders and reduce the valuations of others. An
implication of this fact, is that theauctioneer has incentiveto provide less information than would
be e±cient sinceby doing so, biddersbecomemorehomogenous and competition is increased. The
present paper obtains a similar result in a procurement setting in which ¯rms are horizontally
di®erentiated. However, ouranalysis di®ersof theauctions models in two dimensions: (i) not only
¯rms but the sponsor, haveuncertainty about the optimal design of the project, and (ii) after the
procurement auction we introduce an additional stagein which the sponsor and the winning ¯rm
can renegotiate the initial contract.
The remainder of thepaperis organized as follows. In Section 2 themodel is introduced while
section 3 characterizes the e±cient solution. Section 4 solves the model and presents the main
results of the paper. In Section 5 we brie°y consider the case in which the ¯rms cannot observe
the design speci¯cation level. Section 6 discusses the scope and implications of the model and
presents conclusions. All proofs are all relegated to a technical appendix.
42 The model
Consider a sponsor that plans to undertake a project. The payo® to the sponsor depends on
the project's design d 2 D; where the design space D is a circle of perimeter one. Let d¤ 2 D
denotethe optimal design forthesponsor and assumethat thepayo®to thesponsorfrom a project
d 2 D is V(d) =V ¡(d¡d¤)2, where V is a given real number, so that the payo® is decreasing
in the distance between d and d¤. The sponsor is initially uncertain about the exact location of
the optimal design so that ex ante, d¤ is distributed according to the uniform distribution on the
design space.
There are N risk-neutral potential contractors i = f1;:::;Ng. The location of each potential
contractor di is uniformly distributed on thecircle D. Each potential contractor specializes in one
design, itslocation di 2 D, and itscost of completingan arbitrary design disCi(d) =C+¯(d¡di)2;
where ¯ is meant to capture the specialization level in the contractors' market.
We assume that the sponsor has to make two decisions related to the project design. In a
speci¯cation stage, before contracting, the sponsor conducts research on the location of d¤, and
speci¯es an initial design, denoted by b d by choosing a speci¯cation investment ± 2 [0; 1) ; the
way in which the stochastic relationship between b d and d¤ depends on ± is detailed below. Given
b d, the sponsor awards the project competitively to a potential contractor. During the realization
of the project, new information about the optimal design arises and the sponsor may renegotiate
the initial contract b d with the awarded contractor.
The initial design is partially correlated with the optimal design, in particular we assume it






according with the distribution function G("j±). We make the following assumptions about this
distribution:
Assumption 1 The density function associated to G("j±) is symmetric and centered at 0:
Assumption 2 When ± = 0, G("j±) is equal to the uniform distribution on [¡1
2; 1
2]. When
5± ! 1, the G("j±) converges to3:
G("j1) =
(
0 if " < 0
1 otherwise
Assumption 3G("j±) isdi®erentiableand decreasingin ± for all " lower than 0,
@G("j±)
@± < 0 for
all " 2 (¡1
2; 0), and G("j±) is di®erentiable and increasing in ± for all " greater than 0,
@G("j±)
@± > 0
for all " 2 (0; 1
2).4
[Figure 1 around here]
Given these assumptions b d is also distributed uniformly around the circle, and by assumption
1 it is an unbiased estimator of the optimal design. Assumption 2 implies that when ± = 0 the
initial design is not correlated with the optimal design, whereas when ± = 1 the initial design
coincides with the optimal design. Assumption 3 implies that the variance of the noise decreases
with ±.5 Therefore, the greaterthespeci¯cation investment (thelarger±), thecloser isin expected
terms the initial design of the optimal one.
After the initial design has been speci¯ed and the speci¯cation level has become public infor-
mation, the awarding process takes place. Noticethat oncethebidders observe b d, the distribution
of d¤ is no longer uniform. d¤ is then distributed on the circle according to a posterior distribu-
3That is, as ± goes to in¯nity, the probability that " will be equal to zero converges to 1.
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5An alternative assumption to Assumption 3 might be:
Assumption 3
0 If ± > ±
0 , we can order the distribution functions G("j±) and G("j±
0) in the sense of ¯rst order
stochastic dominance: G("j±) · G("j±
0) 8" 2 [¡ 1
2;0], G("j±) ¸ G("j±
0) 8" 2 [0; 1
2]:
An example of a distribution that is consistent with this new assumption is the uniform distribution on an interval



















1 if " > 1
2(1+±)
Under this alternative assumption, using the techniques of Milgrom and Shanon (1994), we would obtain the same
monotone comparative results. However, Assumption 3 allows us to obtain strictly monotonic results.
6tion F(dj±) depending on the initial b d and the speci¯cation level ±.6 Firms using F(dj±) update
their believes over the optimal design and submit their o®ers to the sponsor. All ¯rms know the
locations of their competitors and this information is veri¯able by the sponsor.7 The sponsor
awards the public work to the most convenient ¯rm (taking into account its bid and its location
technology). The winning ¯rm signs a contract to undertake the initial design. 8 During the
construction of the project, the sponsor and the ¯rm learn the optimal design, and change the
initial contract using bilateral renegotiation that is represented by a Nash Bargaining procedure.
The sponsor's preferences over ¯nal outcomes are represented by the following utility function
US = V(d) ¡p ¡±; where V(d) is valuation of the project and p is the project's price. We want
to characterize the sponsor's optimal investment in design speci¯cation, taking into account how
this investment is going to a®ect the result of the auction process (the winning ¯rm and the
procurement price) as well as the contract's renegotiation. Summarizing, the time sequence of
the model is as follows:
1. The sponsor, knowing the number of ¯rms in the market, N, decides his expenditures on
research, ±; and speci¯es an initial design b d fortheproject. Thespeci¯cation level ± becomes
public information.
6For notational convenience, we take the location of b d as the origin of the circle, and we de¯ne F(dj±) on the
interval [ b d ¡
1
2; b d +
1
2]. Given the above assumptions over the noise distribution, F(dj±) presents the following
characteristics: (i) The density function associated to F(dj±) is symmetric and centered at b d: (ii) When ± = 0,
F(dj±) is equal to the uniform distribution on [ b d ¡
1
2; b d +
1
2]. When ± ! 1, F(dj±) converges to the Dirac delta
function on b d (iii) F(dj±) is decreasing in ± for all d lower than b d and increasing in ± for all d greater than b d .
7Therefore, ¯rms compete in the procurement process like in standard Bertrand competition among heterogenous
¯rms. The purpose of looking at such simpli¯ed setting is to avoid unnecessary complications in the presentation.
We can show that introducing the assumption of asymmetric information over the ¯rm's location does not change
the results of the model as long as we do not consider contracts over realizations of d
¤: If d
¤ is contractible we
can commit to ine±cient ex-post renegotiations of the optimal design in order to reduce the informational rents
(See for example Che (1993)). We are assuming that d
¤ is not contractible and therefore we are not exploring this
problem. However, our conjecture, is that the main results of the paper would still remain when d
¤ is contractible.
Commiting to ine±cient renegotiation of the contract and misspecifying the initial design are two ways to reduce
¯rm rents, and we expect the sponsor would use both of them, if he could.
8Notice that procuring b d is an optimal strategy for the sponsor. He can not increase his pro¯ts by procuring
another design since he does not know ex-ante the location of the ¯rms and the ¯rms are located according to a
uniform distribution. In a related paper Ganuza and Pechivanos (2000) study a model in which the location of the
¯rms and the optimal design are public knowledge (and there is no design renegotiation). In this model the optimal
strategy for the sponsor is to procure a design di®erent from the optimal one (between the optimal design and the
location of the most disadvantaged ¯rm), since by doing that he increases ¯rm competition in the procurement
process.
72. The sponsor announces theinitial design. Firms learn their location (with respect to b d) and
present their bids to the sponsor. The sponsor awards the public project to the ¯rm that
maximizes his expected utility considering its bids and its location technology.
3. The winning ¯rm and the sponsor learn theoptimal design d¤ and, through a Nash bargain-
ing procedure, decide the ¯nal design and the ¯nal price to be paid for the project.9
In the next section we study the benchmark case by characterizing the e±cient solution.
Section 4 provides the solution of the model.
3 Efficient solution
In thissection, weconsidertheproblemof a social planner, who choosesthedesign speci¯cation
level ±E, the winning ¯rm dw, and the ¯nal design dE that maximize total surplus (the sum of
sponsor's utility and the pro¯ts of the winning ¯rm), W =EfUS +¼wg =EfV(d) ¡Cw(d)¡±g:
In maximizing total surplus the planner faces the same informational constraints as the sponsor
so that the timing of the e±cient procurement process can be described as follows:
1. Given the number of ¯rmsin the market, N, thesocial planner decidesresearch expenditure
± and speci¯es an initial design b d for the project.
2. Given b d, the social planner learns the location of the ¯rms and chooses the winning ¯rm.
3. In thecourse of the construction of the project, the social planner learnsthe optimal design.
Given the location of the winning ¯rm and the optimal design, the social planner chooses a
¯nal design for the project.
We solve the model using backwards induction. The next subsection characterizes the ¯nal
design given thewinning ¯rm and the optimal design. Subsection 3.2 will then select the optimal
¯rm to undertake the project given the initial design, the locations of the ¯rms and the design
9This model tries to capture the institutional framework which is used by public administrations to procure large
public works. See Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for a overview of the building
construction industry.
8speci¯cation level. Lastly, subsection 3.3 studies the sponsor problem and provides the e±cient
design speci¯cation level.
3.1 Final design
In the construction stage, when the social planner learns the optimal design d¤, he chooses
the ¯nal design of the project given this optimal design and the location of the winning ¯rm dw.









The optimal ¯nal design turns out to be an average between the location of the awarded ¯rm
and the optimal project design. The weight of the ¯rm's location in the average depends on the
technological parameter ¯. In particular, the larger the specialization of themarket (the larger¯)
thecloser is the ¯nal design to the location of the awarded ¯rm. Notice that when ¯ =0, the case
of homogenous ¯rms, the cost does not depend on the design and the ¯nal design is the optimal
one. On the contrary, when ¯ = 1, ¯rms can only produce one design, and the ¯nal design is
trivially the location of the winning ¯rm.
3.2 The most e±cient ¯rm
In theawardingprocessthesocial plannerhasto choosea ¯rmafterlearningall ¯rms' locations,
dw, i 2 f1;: :: ; Ng. Given dE, the expected surplus of the project depends on the location of
the winning ¯rm and on the speci¯cation level of the initial design. Let S(di;±) be the expected
surplus of the project if it assigned to a ¯rm with location di when the design speci¯cation level
is ±
S(di; ±) = Ed¤fV(dE) ¡Ci(dE)j±g:
9Thefollowing lemmashowshow theexpected surplusof theproject depends on the¯rm'slocation.
Lemma 1 If ± > 0; then the expected surplus is decreasing in the distance between the initial
design and the location of the ¯rm. If ± = 0; then the expected surplus does not depend on the
distance between the initial design and the location of the ¯rms:
Let d1 be the closest location to the initial design b d: Then an immediate corollary of the
previous Lemma characterizes the ¯rm that maximizes the expected surplus.
Corollary 1 The e±cient winning ¯rm is the closest ¯rm to the initial design dw =d1.
The intuition behind this result is the following. The expected surplus of the project will
depend on the distance between the winning ¯rm and the optimal design. Since the initial design
is an unbiased estimator of the optimal design, the closest ¯rm to the initial design is(in expected
terms) the closest ¯rm to the optimal one. Hence, the closest ¯rm is the most e±cient ¯rm ex-
ante. On the other hand, if the social planner does not invest in design speci¯cation, the optimal
design can be with the same probability on any arbitrary place in the circle, implying that the
expected surplus of any ¯rm is the same. Notice that the ¯rm with location d1 may turn out to
be not the most e±cient ¯rm ex-post and that the probability of this event is decreasing in the
design speci¯cation.10
3.3 Optimal design speci¯cation
In thespeci¯cation stage, thesocial plannerhastochoosetheinvestment in design speci¯cation
knowing the number of ¯rms. The expected surplus of the project is now only a function of the
design speci¯cation level.
S(±) =Ed1fS(d1;±)g:
The next result characterizes the relationship between the expected surplus of the project and
the speci¯cation level of the design.
10We do not consider the possibility of replacing the incumbent ¯rm. As a matter of fact, the main results do not
change when we introduce this possibility in the model, as long as the sponsor incurs in a positive cost to replace
the incumbent ¯rm.
10Lemma 2 The expected surplus of the project is increasing in the speci¯cation level of design, ±.
Lemma ?? rests on the fact that the larger is the investment in the project design speci¯ca-
tion, the better is the matching between the technology of the winning ¯rm and the sponsor's
preferences.
Given theabove, thesocial planner hasto choosetheinvestment in design speci¯cation trading
o® increasesin theexpected surplusof theproject against thecost of specifying theinitial project.




First observe that given that S(d1;±) is bounded above, ±E has to be ¯nite. In the following
we will assume that ±E > 0; an assumption which is justi¯ed if the cost of providing very basic
information about the optimal design is su±ciently small. Then, we have:
Proposition 1 The optimal design speci¯cation level ±E is increasing in the number of ¯rms N
and the technological parameter ¯:
The total procurement surplus depends on the distance between the location of the awarded
¯rm and the optimal design. When the number of ¯rms increases, the expected distance between
theinitial design and theawarded ¯rm decreases, with theimplication that theincentives to make
this initial design closer to the optimal one also increase. Following a similar argument, if the
technological parameter ¯ increases, the incentives to reduce the distance between the awarded
¯rm and the optimal design also increases (the match between the sponsor's preferences and the
contractor's technology becomes most important). The only way for the sponsor to ensure an
appropriate match is to reduce the distance between the optimal design and the initial one and
this in turn can only be accomplished by increasing the investment in design speci¯cation.11
11Notice that we did not impose assumptions on the convexity of the problem and therefore we cannot guarantee
that the sponsor's problem is concave. We use the techniques of Edlin and Shannon (1998), that allow us to get
comparative static results in non convex problems, as long as the cross derivatives' conditions are globally satis¯ed
by the problem, a condition that is satis¯ed in our case.
114 Competitive Solution
We solvethe model using backwards induction. Thenext subsection characterizes the solution
of the design's renegotiation. Subsection 4.2 provides the result of the competitive mechanism.
Subsection 4.3 concludes the analysis of the model by studying what is the optimal design speci-
¯cation level.
4.1 Renegotiation of the initial design
When the awarded contractor and the sponsorlearn the optimal design, they bargain over the
¯nal design dC and the ¯nal price of the project pF. At this renegotiation stage they know the
initial design b d, theprocurement pricepp, and thelocation of thewinning ¯rmdw . Weassumethat
the outcome of the bargaining process is the solution of a generalized Nash bargaining problem.12
Let ¼S(dC; pF ) denote the agreement payo®to the sponsor when the ¯nal design is dC and the
¯nal price pF and ½S( b d;pp) his disagreement point. Let ¼F(dC; pF ) denote the agreement payo®
to the winning ¯rm and ½F ( b d;pp) its disagreement point. The ¯nal design dC and ¯nal price pF




Where ® is the ¯rm's bargaining power. Payo® functions are de¯ned as follows. The sponsor's
¯nal surplus is the utility of the ¯nal design minus the new price and the investment in design
speci¯cation, ¼S(dC;pF) = V ¡(dC ¡d¤)2 ¡pF ¡± and his disagreement point is given by the
utility of theinitial design minus the procurement priceand theinvestment in design speci¯cation,
½S( b d; pp) =V ¡( b d¡d¤)2¡pp¡±. The awarded ¯rm's ¯nal pro¯t is thenew price minus the cost
of the new design, ¼F (dC; pF ) =pF ¡C¡¯(dC¡dw)2. Its disagreement point is the procurement
price minus the cost of the initial design, ½F( b d; pp) = pp ¡C ¡¯( b d¡dw)2. Given these payo®
12Notice that in contrast with other models, the assumption of Nash bargaining is not important in our model,
since the negotiation rents of the awarded contractor are discounted in the auction. Di®erent bargaining procedures
can be shown to lead to the same results.
12functions, the Nash bargaining problem can be rewritten as follows
max
dC;pF
(¡(dC ¡d¤)2 ¡pF +(b d¡d¤)2 +pp)®
³
pF ¡¯(dC ¡dw)2 ¡pp +¯(b d¡dw)2
´1¡®
and its solution is characterized in the next lemma.




pF = pp +¯(dC ¡dw)2 ¡¯( b d¡dw)2
+®
³
¡(dC ¡d¤)2 +( b d¡d¤)2 ¡¯(dC ¡dw)2 +¯(b d¡dw)2
´
:
Weareassumingthat in this stagethesponsorand the¯rm both learn theoptimal design. It is
easy to check that as long as thesponsor knows the location of the awarded ¯rm, this assumption
is not necessary. Suppose that only the awarded ¯rm learns the optimal design and it has to
report it to the sponsor. The ¯rm will report the design that maximizes its expected rents, but
given theresult of therenegotiation, theexpected rents are®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F), and thedesign
that maximizes these rents is the optimal design.
Since the bargaining procedure is e±cient, we obtain the same ¯nal design as in the e±cient
solution dC =dE. The ¯nal price can be seen to be equal to the procurement price, plus the cost
to change from the initial design to the ¯nal one, plus a proportion ® (bargaining power) of the
surplusgenerated by thebargaining process: pF =pp+Cw(dC)¡Cw( b d)+®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F):
4.2 Price Competition
Procurement proceeds in three steps. First, ¯rms observe ± and b d and learn their location
with respect to b d. Second, each ¯rm submits a bid, a location-price pair. Third, the sponsor,
taking into account the location of the ¯rms and the price, awards the project to the ¯rm that
submitted the bid that maximizes its expected utility US. The next proposition characterizes the
solution at the procurement stage.
13Lemma 4 The closest ¯rm wins the auction dw =d1, and the procurement price is
pp =C1(b d) ¡Ed¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F)j±g +S(d1;±) ¡S(d2;±);
where d1 is the closest ¯rm to the initial design and d2 is the second closest ¯rm.
The procurement price has three components: the cost of the initial project, the expected
rents from future renegotiation (which are discounted), and the winning ¯rm's expected pro¯t
S(d1; ±) ¡S(d2;±).
Proposition 2 The expected pro¯t of the winning ¯rm is increasing in the speci¯cation level of
the design ±.
This is an important result for the paper: The higher is the speci¯cation level of the design,
the higher is the market power of the winning ¯rm, because the ¯rm's location becomes more
important. In other words, when the initial design is more accurate, the comparative advantage
of the closest ¯rm over the next closest increases and this leads to higher mark-up rents. The
implication of this result is that the sponsor can use the speci¯cation level of the design to control
¯rms' rents.
4.3 Initial design optimal speci¯cation
The sponsor has to ¯nd the speci¯cation of initial design that maximizes its expected surplus






Substituting the expression of the ¯nal price into the expected surplus we obtain
US =Ed1;d2;d¤fV(dC) ¡pp +Cw(dC)¡Cw( b d) +®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F )g ¡±:
and substituting the expected procurement price into this expression and simplifying we obtain
US =Ed1;d¤fV(dC) ¡C1(dC)g+Ed1;d2f¡S(d1;±) +S(d2;±)g ¡±:
14Since Ed1;d¤fV(dC) ¡C1(dC)g =Ed1fS(d1;±)g, we ¯nally obtain that
US = Ed2 fS(d2;±) ¡±g




Comparing this expression to ?? it is easy to see that the expected surplus of the sponsor does
not depend on thelocation of the ¯rm closest to the initial design, i.e., the winning ¯rm (as is the
case in the e±cient solution) but depends on the location of the ¯rm which is the second closest
to the initial design. Apart from this fact, the problem is identical to the e±cient one in ?? and
the intuition of the results presented in the following Proposition is the same as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 The optimal design speci¯cation level ±C in the competitive case is increasing in
the number of the ¯rms N and the technological parameter ¯:
The following proposition presents the main result of the paper.
Proposition 4 The competitive speci¯cation level is less than the e±cient design speci¯cation
level, ±C <±E. The di®erence between the e±cientsolution and the competitive solution converges
to 0 as the number of ¯rms goes to in¯nity
As was remarked above, the sponsor's problem would be equivalent to the social planner's
problem if in the latter we considered the second closest ¯rm instead of the closest ¯rm. Using
this fact, it is easy to see the intuition of the proposition. From Proposition 1 we know that the
larger the number of ¯rms, the closer the winning ¯rm to the initial design, and the larger the
incentives to specify the initial design. Using the same argument, if we take the second closest
¯rm instead of the closest ¯rm, there should be less incentives to specify the initial design.
Thisproposition showsan important trade-o®in design speci¯cation. Assumethat thestarting
point isthecompetitivesolution. If thesponsorincreasesthelevel of speci¯cation thetotal surplus
of theprocurement processgoesup. Thisisduetothefact that the¯nal design iscloserin expected
15terms to the optimal one and the winning ¯rm is the most likely to be the most e±cient ¯rm
to undertake the ¯nal design, ex-post. On the other hand, the increase in design speci¯cation
also increases the rents of the winning ¯rm, and this e®ect turns out to compensate the ¯rst one.
Another way to see the intuition behind the result is that by reducing design speci¯cation, the
comparative advantage of the closest ¯rm in the awarding process decreases. In other words, the
sponsor underinvests in the initial speci¯cation of the project to make potential contractors more
homogeneous, with the underlying goal to intensify competition and reduce its expected transfer.
Finally, when the number of ¯rms goes to in¯nity, the rent of the closest ¯rm converges to
0 because the expected distance with the second closest ¯rm also converges to 0. In such case,
the sponsor's trade o® between reducing the ¯rm rents and increasing the procurement surplus is
eliminated as can be seen from the fact that Ed1fS(d1;±)g ¡Ed2fS(d2; ±)g goes to 0.
4.4 Cost overruns
In theintroduction wementioned therelationship existing between design misspeci¯cation and
cost overruns. This subsection is devoted to formalizethis relationship. Usually cost overruns are
de¯ned as the di®erence between the procurement price and the ¯nal price:
CCO =pF ¡pp =C1(dC) ¡C1(b d) +®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F ):
The next result derives the relationship between expected cost overruns and the initial design
speci¯cation.
Proposition 5 Expected cost overruns of the project are decreasing in the design speci¯cation
level, ±
In other words, since cost overruns are due to reforms of the initial design, the better the
initial design, the fewer reforms of the design will be needed and this implies lower expected cost
overruns. An immediate Corollary characterizes the important relationship between competition
and cost overruns.
16Corollary 2 Expected cost overruns of the project are decreasing in the number of the ¯rms N.
In other words, the more competitive the procurement market, the lower expected cost over-
runs will be. This might be an important result since it shows that any policy devoted to promote
competition in the procurement market, may have the positive e®ect of reducing cost overruns.
Proposition ?? and Corollary ?? havean empirical content, they predict that, ceterist paribus,
more competitive markets lead to more accurate designs and lower cost overruns. In this line,
anecdotal evidence suggest that cost overruns are especially important in military procurement
which isa sector characterized by lack of competition. Welook forward to futureresearch devoted
to formally test these results.
5 Imperfect Information
We are assuming that theinformation related to the optimal design is symmetric between the
sponsor and contractors. In this section we brie°y consider the case the sponsor has some private
information about the real location of the optimal design. The way in which we model that is
that the sponsor does not missrepresent the initial design b d (he does not have incentives to do
that, given thesymmetry of our setting) but ¯rms cannot observe the level of design speci¯cation.
The timing and structure of the game are the same as in the previous section.
1. The sponsor, knowing the number of ¯rms in the market, N, decides his expenditures on
research, ±; and speci¯es an initial design b d for the project. The ¯rms can not observe ± but
they have a common expectation ±0 over it.
2. The sponsor announces theinitial design. Firms learn their location (with respect to b d) and
given their expectations, present their bids to the sponsor. The sponsor awards the public
project to the ¯rm that maximizes his expected utility considering the ¯rm's bid and its
location technology.
3. The winning ¯rm and the sponsor learn theoptimal design d¤ and, through a Nash bargain-
17ing procedure, decide the ¯nal design and the ¯nal price to be paid for the project.
We solve the model using backwards induction.
5.1 Renegotiation of the initial design
The renegotiation process between the sponsor and the winning ¯rm has the same solution
that in the previous game (when the awarded contractor learns d¤ thespeci¯cation level does not
play any role). Therefore, given the optimal design d¤ and the winning ¯rm dw, the ¯nal design






p +¯(dII ¡dw)2 ¡¯( b d¡dw)2
+®
³
¡(dII ¡d¤)2 +(b d¡d¤)2 ¡¯(dII ¡dw)2 +¯(b d¡dw)2
´
:
As a consequence, the focus is on the procurement stage and the design speci¯cation problem.
5.2 Price competition
The procurement proceeds as in the previous section. In order to solve the problem we have
assumed that the ¯rms have common expectation regarding the project's speci¯cation level ±0.
Given this expectation, we obtain similar results to those in the previous section: the closest ¯rm
to the initial design wins the auction dw =d1, the procurement price will be
pII
p =C1(b d) ¡Ed¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F)j±0g +S(d1;±0) ¡S(d2;±0):
5.3 Initial design optimal speci¯cation
Given the above, the sponsor's ex ante payo® is
Ed1;d2;d¤fUSg =Ed1;d2;d¤fV(dII) ¡pII
F ¡±g:
18and substituting the ¯nal price we get
Ed1;d2;d¤fUSg = Ed1;d2;d¤fV(dII)¡C1(dII) ¡®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F)g
+Ed1;d¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F)j±0g+Ed1;d2f¡S(d1;±0) +S(d2;±0)g¡±:
Notice that, when unobserved, the speci¯cation level chosen by the sponsor cannot a®ect ¯rms'
expectation ±0 so that the term
Ed1;d¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F)j±0g+Ed1;d2f¡S(d1; ±0) +S(d2;±0)g
does not depend on ±. Given this the sponsor's problem is equivalent to the following problem
±II 2 argmax
±
Ed1fS(d1; ±)g¡Ed1;d¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F )g ¡±
and we have the following result.
Proposition 6 If the winning ¯rm has some bargaining power ®> 0, the competitive speci¯cation
level with imperfect information is higher than the e±cient design speci¯cation level ±II > ±E: If
the sponsor has all the bargaining power ® =0, in the ex post renegotiation of the contract, then
the solution is the e±cient solution.
Observe that the sponsor knows that ¯rms discounts design renegotiation rents in their bids
but is unable to a®ect these discounts. For this reason, he tries to reduce ¯rms' ex post rents
by overinvesting in design speci¯cation. The higher the investment in design's speci¯cation, the
lower the rents of the winning ¯rm during the renegotiation process.
In order to calculatethesponsor'stotal surplus notethat thesponsor has a dominant strategy
±II given that he can not a®ect ¯rms' expectations. Although this is not important to derive
the equilibrium design speci¯cation level (as ±II turns out to be a dominant strategy, given the
continuation game) in a Nash equilibrium ¯rms correctly forecast the sponsor's strategy, so that
±0 = ±II. Using this fact, the next corollary shows that the sponsor is worse o® than in the case
in which ¯rms can observe the design speci¯cation level.
19Corollary 3 Under unobservability of design speci¯cation level, the Nash equilibrium payo® for
the sponsor is
US =Ed2fS(d2; ±II) ¡±IIg
and is lower than the Nash equilibrium payo® of the case with observable design speci¯cation level
Corollary ?? provides a reasonable result. When comparing a Stackelberg game (the case in
which ¯rms can observe±) with thecasein which ¯rmscannot observesuch ±, thesponsor's pro¯ts
are larger in the former case. An important implication of this corollary is that the sponsor has
incentives to keep theinformation related to theoptimal design symmetric (to provide to the¯rms
all the information related to the optimal design, making the speci¯cation level ± observable). In
the case of public procurement there are two ways in which the sponsor can make ± observable:
² The sponsor can commit to an observable design speci¯cation by delegating an independent
¯rm the task of specifying the initial design.
² Given information on the value of ± can be inferred ex-post, a sponsor that cares about
future payo®s may want to establish a reputation for underinvesting in the speci¯cation of
the initial design to intensify competition among contractors.
6 Conclusions
Since public procurement accounts for a signi¯cant fraction of economic activity and since it
is not unusual that public project end up with a ¯nal cost several times higher than the initial
estimates, cost overruns are a very important issue for economists, politicians and the public.
The ¯rst goal of this paper was to provide an explanation for cost overruns in public pro-
curement. We have developed a model in which cost overruns arise as a consequence of the
renegotiation of an initial contract. Given existing uncertainty on the project's optimal design,
the sponsor can devote resources to providean initial estimate. Since this is costly, the sponsor is
likely to providea description of theproject that, while an unbiased estimateof the optimal loca-
tion will di®er from it in all probability. Given this, as the project's optimal location is learned in
20the realization stage, the awarded contractor and the sponsor are likely to have strong incentives
to engage in a bilateral renegotiation to modify the initial design of the project. Cost overruns
arise as a consequence of this design renegotiation.
Our results show that in equilibrium the sponsor has incentives to invest less in the design's
speci¯cation than would bee±cient (keeping into account only thecost of the initial design speci-
¯cation). The intuition of the result is that by reducing design speci¯cation, the sponsor promotes
¯ercercompetition among contractors: Lowering theinitial design speci¯cation, homogenizeshori-
zontally di®erentiated potential contractorsand in particulardecreasesthecomparativeadvantage
of the most e±cient ¯rm.
This paper sheds light on one trade o® in public procurement. While a more accurate spec-
i¯cation of an initial design increases the probability to award the project to the most e±cient
¯rm, it also increases the rents of the latter. Since under perfect competition there no design
misspeci¯cation takes place (as rents are eliminated) the above mentioned trade o® disappears
and the initial design speci¯cation is the e±cient one. Given this cost overruns can be seem as a
consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market and we can conclude that public
policies promoting competition in procurement markets are also likely to reduce cost overruns in
public works.
Finally, we have to point out that our analysis has been carried out under the assumption of
symmetric information related to the optimal design between sponsor and potential contractors.
In the working paper version of this paper Ganuza (2003), it is shown that this assumption is
necessary for our results. However, it is also shown that this is a sensible assumption since the
sponsorobtains higherpro¯tsby keeping symmetric theinformation related to theoptimal design.
The sponsor can commit to keep the information symmetric by establishing a reputation if he
has a long term relationship with contractors or by delegating to an independent ¯rm the task of
specifying the initial design.
21A Appendix
As a convention and without loss of generality we are going to consider in the appendix that
b d = 0 and di; d1;d2 2 [0; 1
2]. We need to state some preliminary facts before we start with the
proofs of the results.
Let Gd1(d; N) and Gdi(d;N) be the distributions of the expected distance between the ini-
tial design b d and the closest ¯rm d1 and the ¯rm which is the ¯rm i closest to b d, respectively.
These distributions do not depend on the initial design and it can be shown that
@Gd1(d;N)
@N < 0
8d 2 (0; 1
2). These distributions are ordered in a strict ¯rst order stochastic dominance sense,
Gd1(d;N) >Gdi(d;N), for all d2 (0; 1
2):
Proof of lemma ??: The expected surplus of an arbitrary ¯rm di given that the initial design
is b d= 0 and the speci¯cation level is ±; is
S(di; ±) = Ed¤fV(dE) ¡Ci(dE)j±g
= Ed¤fV ¡C ¡(dE ¡d¤)2 ¡¯(dE ¡di)2j±g:
By plugging dE = ¯di+d¤
1+¯ into the expression and then factorizing, we get




Since d¤ is distributed on [¡1
2; 1
2] according to F(dj±); this expectation is









Notice that, due to the fact that the design space is a circle, there are two distances between di
and d¤ and we have to consider only the shortest length arc.































22By using the symmetry of F(dj±) we get














((di ¡s)2 +(1¡di ¡s)2)f(sj±)ds















Integrating by parts the second term we get

















It is interesting to see the special cases ± = 0 and ± =1. We have that







If there is no investment in design speci¯cation, the expected surplus does not depend on the
location of the ¯rm. On the other hand





when the initial design is the optimal one, case ± = 1, the expected surplus only depends on the













By using that F(1
2¡dij±) is increasing in ±; and
@S(di;0)
@di =0; wecan concludethat given the¯rm's
location di, this expression is negative for ± > 0: Then the surplus is decreasing in the distance
between the initial design and the ¯rm's location.
Proof of lemma ??: The expected procurement surplus, given that the winning ¯rm is the
closest ¯rm to the initial design, is




Therefore, to prove thelemma we have to show that Ed¤;d1f( d¤¡d1)2j±g is decreasing on ±: First,
we analyze the sum of the expected quadratic distance between the optimal design and all the
23¯rms. Let Ai be theexpected quadratic distancebetween the optimal design and the ¯rms which
is ¯rm i closest to the initial design.
N X
i=1
Ai = Ed¤;d1f(d¤ ¡d1)2j±g
+Ed¤;d2f(d¤ ¡d2)2j±g +¢ ¢¢ +Ed¤;dNf(d¤ ¡dN)2j±g:
Rearranging terms we get
N X
i=1




It is clear that this sum does not depend on ± since the relative position of the ¯rms is not
important when we are adding all the distances. Therefore, the derivative of this sum respect to










The next step is to show that @Ai¡A1
@± > 0 for every i 6= 1 . Using similar computations to






















































@± >0 and Gd1(z;N) > Gdi(z;N) 8z 2 (0; 1
2). But given that thederivative of the sum
is 0, and given that
@(Ai¡A1)
@± >0 for every i 6=1; this implies that @A1
@± < 0, which concludes the
proof.
Proof of proposition ??: We are going to use a result of Edlin and Shannon (1998), that
allows us to obtain strictly monotonic static comparative results without making assumptions on
the concavity of the distribution functions.
13Notice, that dX and d
o are independent variables, and we do not need to specify the joint distribution.
24Theorem 1 (Edlin and Shannon (1998)) Let S ½<; f : <£< ! <; x¤ 2 argmaxx2S f(x; t¤)
and x0 2 argmaxx2S f(x;t0): Suppose that f is C1 and has increasing marginal returns, and that
x¤ 2 int S . Then x0 >x¤ if t0 >t¤, and x0 <x¤ if t0 < t¤:















































Where, x= ±;t =N;and S =<+ [ 0: Therefore the only condition that we have to check is that
f(x;t) has increasing marginal returns, so that @f
@t is increasing in t:
To verify this condition, we compute the cross derivative
@2f
@N@±. First, from di®erentiating















































@± > 0 and
@Gd1(z;N)
@N > 0 we get that the whole expression is positive, and f(±;N)
has increasing marginal returns. Therefore, applying Theorem ??, we conclude that the optimal
design speci¯cation level ±E is increasing in the number of ¯rms N:














































is negative. Then, applying theorem ??, we conclude that the optimal design speci¯cation level
±E is increasing in the technological parameter ¯.
Proof of lemma ??: The bargaining problem between the winning ¯rm and the sponsor is
max
dC;pF
(¡(dC ¡d¤)2 ¡pF +( b d¡d¤)2 +pp)®
³
pF ¡¯(dC ¡dw)2 ¡pp +¯(b d¡dw)2
´1¡®
:
From totally di®erentiating with respect to dC and pF weget thetwo ¯rst order conditions. After
simplifying we get








pF ¡¯(dC ¡dw)2 ¡pp +¯(b d¡dw)2
´
:




pF = pp +¯(dC ¡dw)2 ¡¯( b d¡dw)2
+®
³
¡(dC ¡d¤)2 +( b d¡d¤)2 ¡¯(dC ¡dw)2 +¯(b d¡dw)2
´
:
which concludes the proof.
Proof of lemma ??: First, we recall two previous results that we will use for the proof. By
Lemma ?? we know that the negotiation is e±cient and that given ± and the winning ¯rm, the
competitive mechanism produces the same surplus as in the e±cient solution. By Lemma ?? we
know that given ± >0 the closest ¯rm is the ¯rm that produces the largest expected surplus.
Second we are going to normalize the bids in the auction. Assume that the bids are
bi =Ci( b d)¡Ed¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F )j±g+¼i:
26With this normalization, we can see that ¼i is the expected pro¯t of the ¯rm i when it presents
the bid bi. Using this normalization, when the sponsor grants the project to ¯rm i his expected
surplus is
US =S(di;±) ¡¼i ¡±:
Suppose that the ¯rm dj 6=d1 is winning theproject. Since, by individual rationality ¼j ¸ 0 , the
sponsor surplus must be lower than or equal to S(dj;±) ¡±: But, in this case the closest ¯rm dI
can o®er a better bid, with a pro¯t ¼1 = S(d1; ±) ¡S(dj;±) ¡², with ² >0. The sponsor obtains
a higher surplus with this o®er (S(dj;±) ¡ ± +²) and the closest ¯rm obtains positive pro¯ts.
Therefore, the winning ¯rm must be the closest ¯rm to the initial design dw =d1.
Using the same argument, we conclude that the procurement price must be
b1 = C1(b d)¡Ed¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F )j±g+S(d1; ±)¡S(d2; ±)
It is easy to check that the closest ¯rm can not increase this o®er. This is because the second
closest ¯rm could get the project with a bid equal to b2 =C2( b d)¡Ed¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F )j±g.
Proof of Proposition ??: By Lemma 3 we know the expected pro¯t of the winning ¯rm is
the di®erence between the expected surplus with its location and the expected surplus with the
location of the second closest ¯rm to the initial design:
















(gd1(z; N) ¡gd2(z; N))dz

















































@± > 0, and Gd1(z; N) > Gd2(z; N) for
all z 2 (0; 1
2):
Proof of Proposition ??: We follow the same argument that we have used in the proof of
Proposition ??.




This problem is equivalent to
±C 2 argmax
±
Ed1;d2fS(d1; ±) ¡¦(±) ¡±g
Where¦(±) =Ed1fS(d1; ±)g¡Ed2fS(d2;±)g is theexpected pro¯t of the winning ¯rm. By Lemma
?? we know that
@¦(±)
@± > 0. In order to show the result we will show that ±C > ±E and ±C = ±E
are not possible.
² Case 1: ±C > ±E. This is not possible, since in this case ±E provides more surplus to the
sponsor than ±C:
Ed2;d1fS(d1; ±E) ¡¦(±E) ¡±Eg > Ed2;d1fS(d1; ±C) ¡¦(±C) ¡±Cg
This inequality follows from ±E 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1; ±)¡±gg and ¦( ±E) < ¦( ±C).
² Case 2: ±C = ±E. It is not possible since ±E 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1; ±)¡±gg and
@¦(±)
@± > 0
implies than ±C = ±E cannot satis¯es the ¯rst order condition of the problem.
Proof of proposition ??: The expected cost overruns are
CCO =Ed1;d¤fC1(dC) ¡C1( b d) +®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F )j±g
Since C1( b d) does not depend on ±; in order to show that the cost overruns are decreasing in ±;
we only need to show that Ed1;d¤fC1(dC)j±g and Ed1;d¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F)j±g are decreasing
in ±:
28By plugging the expression of theoptimal design dC =
¯d1+d¤
(1+¯ into Ed1;d¤fC1(dC)j±g, and then
factorizing, we get




Therefore we need to show that E
d1;d¤f( d¤ ¡d1)2j±g is decreasing on ±: But this was proved in
the proof of Lemma ??.
We denote by R(±) the rent of the awarded ¯rm in the renegotiation of the design.
R(±) = Ed1;d¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡½S ¡½F) j±g
R(±) = Ed1;d¤f®
³
¡(dC ¡d¤)2 +(b d¡d¤)2 ¡¯(dC ¡d1)2 +¯(b d¡d1)2
´
j±g




(d¤ ¡d1)2j±g+Ed1f®¯(b d¡d1)2g+Ed¤f®(b d¡d¤)2j±g




















































the variance of d¤. The second term is decreasing in ±, since by assumption 3 F(dj±) is increasing
in ±, 8d2 [ b d; b d+ 1
2]: Finally, thethird and fourth terms do not depend on ±: Thewhole argument
implies that R(±) is decreasing on ± and this concludes the proof.
Proof of corollary ??: Immediate from propositions ?? and ??.
Proof of proposition ??: By the same argument of the proof of Proposition ??, given that
±E 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1;±) ¡ ±gg and ±II 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1;±) ¡± ¡R(±)gg; in order to
29prove ±E < ±II , we only need to show that R(±) is decreasing in ±. But this was proven in
Proposition ??.
Proof of corollary ??: Notice that
Ed2;d¤fS(d2; ±C) ¡±Cg > Ed2;d¤fS(d2;±II) ¡±IIg
is immediate because ±C 2 argmaxfEd2;d¤fS(d2; ±)¡±gg; and ±C 6= ±II ( ±E · ±II and ±E > ±C).
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Figure 1: Two arbitrary density functions of e where ± >±0:
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